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Abstract.	Many	philosophers	think	that	it	is	only	because	we	happen	to	want	or	care	about	things	that	we	think	
some	things	of	value.	We	start	off	caring	about	things,	and	then	project	these	desires	onto	the	external	world.	In	
this	chapter,	I	make	a	preliminary	case	for	the	opposite	view,	that	it	is	our	evaluative	thinking	that	is	prior	or	comes	
first.	On	this	view,	it	is	only	because	we	think	some	things	of	value	that	we	care	about	or	want	anything	at	all.	This	
view	 is	 highly	 explanatory.	 In	 particular,	 it	 explains	 (i) the	 special	 role	 that	 pleasure	 and	 pain	 play	 in	 our	
motivational	systems,	(ii) why	phenomenal	consciousness	evolved,	and	(iii) how	the	two	main	competing	theories	
of	normative	reasons	for	action—i.e.,	objectivism	and	subjectivism—can	be	reconciled.	After	explaining	why	this	
is	so,	I	respond	to	the	most	serious	objections	to	this	view,	including	that	it	cannot	account	for	temptation	and	
willpower,	or	for	the	existence	and	appropriateness	of	the	reactive	attitudes. 
Keywords.	 Desire;	 evaluative	 belief;	 guise	 of	 the	 good;	 value;	 phenomenal	 consciousness;	 pleasure;	 pain;	
normative	reasons	for	action;	objectivism;	subjectivism;	willpower;	weakness	of	will;	reactive	attitudes. 
	
	
1.	Introduction	
	
What	is	the	relationship	between	desire1	and	evaluative	belief2?	Many	philosophers	
think	that	there	is	no	deep	or	special	relationship	between	these	kinds	of	states.	
Thinking	something	good	can	cause	one	to	want	it,	as	when,	for	example,	thinking	
that	a	Bernie	Sanders	victory	would	be	a	good	thing	leads	one	to	want	it.	Also,	
wanting	something	can	cause	one	(via	certain	irrational	processes)	to	think	it	good,	
as	when,	for	example,	a	desire	that	Roger	Federer	win	causes	one	to	think	that	his	
winning	would	be	a	good	thing.	But	this	exhausts	the	relationship.	It	is	entirely	
possible	to	want	something	without	thinking	it	good	at	all—for	example,	for	one’s	
friend	to	fail.	It	is	also	possible	to	think	something	good	without	wanting	it	at	all—for	
example,	a	trip	to	the	dentist.	Finally,	when	one	both	wants	something	and	thinks	it	
                                                
1	Desires	are	the	springs	of	action.	To	want	something	is	(at	least,	in	part)	to	be	disposed	to	
bring	it	about.	Without	desire,	there	could	be	no	motivation	or	free	action.	Even	the	belief	
that	something	has	value	or	worth,	or	that	some	action	is	morally	required,	would	be	
insufficient	to	motivate	a	being	who	happened	to	care	about	nothing.	Moreover,	desires	are	
fundamentally	for	states	of	affairs,	not	objects.	While	we	often	speak	of	wanting	particular	
objects—say,	a	coffee,	a	raise,	a	holiday,	etc.—what	we	mean	here,	strictly	speaking,	is	that	
we	want	it	to	be	the	case	that	we	get	one	of	these	things.	Finally,	desires	can	be	either	
intrinsic	or	instrumental.	To	want	something	intrinsically	is	to	want	it	for	its	own	sake.	To	
want	something	instrumentally	is	to	want	it	for	the	sake	of	something	else.	For	more	on	the	
concept	of	desire,	see	Schroeder	(2004).	
2	An	evaluative	belief	is	a	belief	that	a	particular	thing	is	good	(or	has	value)	simpliciter.	The	
good	simpliciter	is	that	which	makes	the	world	go	better	rather	than	worse,	impersonally	
considered.	Something	can	be	good	in	some	way,	even	if	it	is	not	good	all-things-considered	
(or	best).	
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good,	the	strength	of	one’s	desire	can	be	quite	out	of	proportion	to	the	degree	to	
which	one	thinks	it	good.	
Some	philosophers,	however,	believe	that	there	is	a	deep	or	special	
relationship	between	desire	and	evaluative	belief.	One	common	idea,	for	example,	is	
that	desire	is	in	some	sense	prior	or	fundamental.	Whenever	we	think	something	
good	this	is	only	because	there	is	something	we	want,	and	we	are	projecting	this	
desire	onto	the	external	world.	A	second	possibility	is	that	desires	and	evaluative	
beliefs	are	really	just	one	and	the	same	kind	of	state,	or	else	that	evaluative	beliefs	
are	a	particular	kind	of	desire.3	A	third	possibility	is	that	desires	are	identical,	not	to	
evaluative	beliefs,	but	to	appearances	of	the	good.	On	this	proposal,	to	desire	
something	is	for	it	to	seem	good	to	one.4	In	the	same	way	a	straight	stick	in	water	
can	look	bent,	in	wanting	something,	one	is	in	a	state	in	which	this	thing	seems	good	
to	one,	even	though	one	might	know	it	is	not.	
In	this	chapter,	I	want	to	make	a	preliminary	case	for	a	different	kind	of	deep	
or	special	relationship	between	desire	and	evaluative	belief.	I	will	argue	that	it	is	
evaluative	thinking	that	comes	first	or	is	prior,	and	in	some	sense	explains	all	desire.	
This	view,	Evaluative	Beliefs	First	(EBF),	involves	two	claims,	both	asserted	as	
necessary	truths:	
	
1. Each	of	us	has	just	one	intrinsic	desire,	for	the	good	(understood	de	dicto	
rather	than	de	re).	More	precisely,	the	content	of	this	desire	is	that	things	
go	better	rather	than	worse.	
2. Every	other	desire	we	have—i.e.,	every	instrumental	desire—is	the	
combination	of	(a)	this	intrinsic	desire	for	the	good	and	(b)	some	belief	
that	a	certain	thing	(the	thing	desired)	would	be	good	in	some	way.	
	
According	to	EBF,	while	no	desire	is	identical	to	an	evaluative	belief,	some	desires	
(instrumental	ones)	are	partly	constituted	by	evaluative	beliefs.	
I	will	start	off	by	outlining	some	major	benefits	of	EBF.	EBF,	I	will	argue,	
allows	us	to	explain:	
	
i. the	special	role	that	pleasure	and	pain	play	in	our	motivational	systems,	
ii. why	phenomenal	consciousness	evolved,	and		
iii. how	the	two	main	competing	theories	of	normative	reasons	for	action—
i.e.,	objectivism	and	subjectivism—can	be	reconciled.	
	
I	will	then	respond	to	what	I	consider	the	most	serious	objections	to	EBF.	Finally,	I	
will	explain	some	important	implications	of	EBF.	
	
2.	The	Role	of	Pleasure	and	Pain	
	
Pleasure	and	pain	have	a	special	role	to	play	in	the	motivational	systems	of	all	
desiring	creatures.	Consider	the	following	five	facts:	
                                                
3	For	some	suggestions	along	these	lines,	see	Humberstone	(1987),	McNaughton	(1988),	and	
Gregory	(forthcoming)	
4	See	especially	Stampe	(1987),	Tenenbaum	(2007),	Oddie	(2005).		
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1. Pleasures	and	pains	are	the	first	things	we	humans	care	about.	
2. Pleasures	and	pains	are	the	only	things	most	non-human	animals	ever	come	
to	care	about.	Only	intelligent	creatures,	like	us,	ever	come	to	have	broader	
concerns.	
3. It	is	only	intelligent	beings,	like	us,	who	ever	cease	to	care	about	their	own	
pleasures	and	pains.	
4. Evolution	works	by	selecting	for	creatures	for	whom	the	things	conducive	to	
survival	and	reproduction	(e.g.,	sex,	nutritious	food,	treatment	of	wounds,	
etc.)	are	pleasurable,	and	for	whom	the	things	that	interfere	with	survival	
and	reproduction	(e.g.,	bodily	damage)	are	painful.	It	does	not	work	by	
selecting	for	beings	who	care	about	these	things	directly.	
5. There	is	vast	agreement	in	the	desires	of	all	desiring	creatures	for	pleasure	
and	avoidance	of	pain.	
	
If	EBF	is	true,	we	can	explain	these	things.	Why	are	pleasures	and	pains	the	first	
things	we	humans	care	about?	And	why	is	it	only	intelligent	creatures,	like	us,	who	
ever	come	to	have	broader	concerns?	If	EBF	is	true,	we	can	say	it	is	because	
pleasures	and	pains	are	the	most	obviously	good	and	bad	things,	respectively.	We	
humans	care	about	pleasures	and	pains	before	anything	else	because	caring	about	
things	involves	having	evaluative	thoughts,	and	the	most	basic	evaluative	truths	are	
that	pleasure	is	good	and	pain	is	bad.	We	come	to	care	about	things	beyond	our	own	
pleasures	and	pains	just	when	we	start	to	recognise	value	in	other	things	(say,	in	the	
well-being	of	others).	Most	non-human	animals,	by	contrast,	care	only	about	their	
own	pleasures	and	pains	because	caring	involves	having	evaluative	thoughts,	and	
such	animals	never	reach	the	level	of	sophistication	in	their	evaluative	thinking	
required	to	recognise	value	in	other	things.	
If	EBF	is	true,	it	is	no	coincidence	that	the	first	things	we	humans	come	to	care	
about,	and	the	only	things	most	non-human	animals	ever	come	to	care	about,	are	
also	the	most	obviously	good	and	bad	things.	It	is	not	otherwise	so	easy	to	explain	
why	this	is	so.	
Now,	some	philosophers	are	reluctant	to	accept	that	non-human	animals	like	
cats,	dogs,	etc.,	are	capable	of	thinking	in	evaluative	terms	at	all.	But	it	is	important	
to	emphasise	that	all	I	am	proposing	we	attribute	to	such	animals	is	some	
awareness,	possibly	hazy,	when	they	are	feeling	some	pain,	that	there	is	something	
awful	going	on	here	(something	worth	avoiding),	and	when	they	are	feeling	some	
pleasure,	that	there	is	something	good	going	on	here	(something	worth	having	or	
promoting).	These	are	very	basic	insights,	and	as	Irwin	Goldstein	says,	“creatures	of	
elementary	intelligence	are	still	capable	of	elementary	insights”.5	The	idea	is	not,	of	
course,	that	these	animals	can	think	about	value,	or	have	evaluative	thoughts	in	
anything	like	a	human	language.	
Consider,	next,	that	it	is	only	intelligent	beings,	like	us,	who	are	capable	of	
ceasing	to	care	about	their	own	pleasures	and	pains—for	example,	in	the	case	of	
certain	monks	or	yogis.	What	explains	this	fact?	If	EBF	is	true,	we	can	explain	it	by	
pointing	out	that	it	is	only	humans	who	are	sophisticated	enough	in	their	evaluative	
                                                
5	Goldstein	(1980),	p.	357.	
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thinking	to	think	that	pleasure	and	pain	are	not	of	value	(whether	or	not	this	thought	
is	ultimately	true).	The	only	beings	who	ever	come	to	be	indifferent	to	their	own	
pleasures	and	pains	are	those	who,	after	some	amount	of	study	or	ideological	
commitment,	come	to	think	that	these	feelings	do	not,	after	all,	matter.	On	EBF,	this	
is	no	coincidence.	By	contrast,	why	do	cats,	dogs,	etc.,	never	cease	to	care	about	
their	own	pleasures	and	pains?	If	EBF	is	true,	it	is	because	they	are	incapable	of	the	
requisite	level	of	sophistication	in	their	evaluative	thinking.	Without	EBF,	there	is	
considerable	mystery	here.	
How	does	evolution	work?	It	works	by	selecting	for	creatures	for	whom	the	
things	conducive	to	survival	and	reproduction	(e.g.,	sex,	nutritious	food,	treatment	
of	wounds,	etc.)	are	pleasurable,	and	for	whom	the	things	that	interfere	with	
survival	and	reproduction	(e.g.,	bodily	damage)	are	painful.	It	works,	in	other	words,	
by	exploiting	a	desire,	common	to	all	creatures,	for	pleasure	and	avoidance	of	pain.	
It	does	not	work	by	selecting	for	creatures	who	want	sex,	nutritious	food,	treatment	
of	wounds,	avoidance	of	bodily	damage,	etc.,	directly.	
If	EBF	is	true,	we	can	easily	explain	why	evolution	works	like	this.	It	is	because	
it	had	to.	There	can	be	no	beings	who	care	intrinsically	about	sex,	nutritious	food,	
and	so	on.	So,	such	beings	were	simply	not	available	for	evolution	to	select	for.6	By	
contrast,	if	EBF	is	false,	it	is	hard	to	explain	why	evolution	works	like	this.	
Consider,	finally,	the	vast	agreement	or	uniformity	in	the	desires	of	all	desiring	
creatures	for	pleasure	and	avoidance	of	pain.	This	agreement	is	itself	quite	striking,	
and	calls	out	for	an	explanation,	especially	given	how	different	most	creatures	are	
from	each	other	in	almost	all	other	respects.	If	EBF	is	true,	we	can	explain	this	
uniformity	simply	by	noting	again	the	sheer	obviousness	of	the	fact	that	pleasure	is	
good	and	pain	is	bad.	We	all	agree	here	because	we	are	responding	to	the	way	
things	are.	If	EBF	is	false,	it	is	not	so	easy	to	explain	this	vast	uniformity.7	
	
3.	Why	Phenomenal	Consciousness	Evolved	
	
A	key	question	in	the	philosophy	of	mind	is	why	phenomenal	consciousness	
evolved.8	According	to	one	proposed	answer,	it	evolved	just	because	there	was	an	
evolutionary	advantage	in	being	able	to	sense	or	detect	things	in	one’s	environment	
(say,	food,	danger,	how	to	get	from	A	to	B,	etc.).	But	there	is	a	glaring	problem	with	
this	answer.	This	is	that	there	seems	no	reason	why	such	detection	should	require	
phenomenology	or	an	inner	life,	no	reason	why	it	couldn’t	have	all	gone	on	‘in	the	
dark’.	Many	entities,	after	all—robots,	thermostats,	plants,	and	so	on—can	sense	
things	in	their	environment	without	having	any	phenomenology.	Why	couldn’t	we	
have	had	the	same	functional	properties	we	do	but	without	an	inner	life?	
                                                
6	There	can,	on	EBF,	be	beings	who	believe	that	sex,	nutritious	food,	etc.,	are	intrinsically	
good,	and	so	who	want	these	things	not	simply	as	a	means	to	pleasure	or	avoidance	of	pain.	
But	such	evaluative	thinking	is	sufficiently	sophisticated	that	it	was	unlikely	to	have	occurred	
as	a	mutation	early	on	in	our	evolutionary	history.	
7	We	cannot	explain	it	in	terms	of	an	appeal	to	evolution.	As	I’ve	mentioned,	evolution	
seems	to	work	by	exploiting	the	universal	desire	for	pleasure	and	avoidance	of	pain.	
8	Phenomenal	consciousness	exists	just	where	there	are	mental	states	such	that	there	is	
something	‘that	it	is	like’	to	be	in	them.	
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If	EBF	is	true,	there	is	a	better	answer	available.	Consciousness	evolved	
because	(i)	it	was	necessary	for	desire,	and	(ii)	desire	(specifically,	desire	for	the	
things	conducive	to	survival	and	reproduction)	was	fitness-enhancing.	Why	was	
consciousness	necessary	for	desire?	It	is	because	
	
A. desire	requires	evaluative	thought,	
B. the	“cheapest”	(or	perhaps	only)	way	for	creatures	to	acquire	evaluative	
concepts—and	so	to	start	thinking	in	evaluative	terms—was	by	
encountering	things	of	value,	and		
C. pleasures	and	pains	are	the	most	obviously	good	and	bad	things	(and	
might	even	be	necessary	conditions	of	value	in	the	universe).	
	
Consciousness	was	selected	for,	in	other	words,	not	for	its	ability	to	help	us	detect	
things	in	and	navigate	our	environment,	but	for	the	value	it	made	possible,	and	so	
(due	to	the	truth	of	EBF)	for	the	desiring	it	allowed.	It	was	selected	for,	that	is,	for	its	
evaluative	properties.	
Here,	I	propose,	is	how	things	went:	At	some	point	in	evolutionary	history,	
beings	happened	to	pop	into	existence	(as	a	result	of	random	mutation)	for	whom	
there	was	something	‘that	it	is	like’	to	be	them	(including	feelings	of	pleasure	and	
pain).	These	beings	started	having	evaluative	thoughts	(upon	realising	the	value	of	
these	pleasures	and	pains).	Some	of	them	then	formed	intrinsic	desires	for	the	good,	
and	so	started	pursuing	their	own	pleasures	and	avoiding	their	own	pains.	When	
further	random	mutations	occurred	resulting	in	beings	that	experienced	pain	on	
being	injured,	and	pleasure	on	eating	nutritious	food,	these	beings	did	considerably	
better	than	any	others	at	surviving	and	reproducing.	
I	will	not	here	attempt	to	defend	(C),	except	to	note	that	it	does	not	entail	
hedonism	of	any	sort.	My	own	view	happens	to	be	the	strong	one,	on	which	nothing	
has	value	except	insofar	as	it	contributes	to	pleasure	or	pain-avoidance.	But	this	
strong	view	isn’t	required	here.	Many	non-hedonists	are	willing	to	accept	that	
pleasures	and	pains	are	the	most	obviously	good	and	bad	things,	and	even	that	their	
existence	is	a	necessary	condition	of	value	in	the	universe.9	
What	can	be	said	in	defense	of	(B)?	Perhaps	evaluative	thought	requires	
contact	with	things	of	value	in	the	same	way	that	understanding	what	red	is	requires	
experiences	of	red.10	But	a	weaker	claim	will	suffice	for	my	purposes	here.	All	that	
the	above	argument	requires	is	that	the	only	available	way—or	perhaps	even	just	
the	“cheapest”	or	most	efficient	way—of	early	beings	coming	to	possess	evaluative	
concepts	was	by	their	encountering	things	of	value.	
Note	that	the	story	I	have	given	does	not	explain	why	phenomenal	
consciousness	occurred	as	a	mutation	in	the	first	place.	It	explains	only	why,	once	
phenomenal	consciousness	occurred,	it	was	selected	for.	
	
4.	Reconciling	Reasons	
	
                                                
9	See	Kagan	(2009).	
10	For	the	claim	that	understanding	what	red	is	requires	experiences	of	red,	see	Jackson	
(1982).	
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Normative	reasons	for	action	are	those	reasons	we	have	to	do	certain	things.11	There	
are	two	main	theories	of	such	reasons:	subjectivism	and	objectivism.	According	to	
subjectivism,	our	reasons	are	provided	by	our	desires.	When	we	have	a	reason	to	do	
something,	this	is	just	because	our	doing	it	would	satisfy	some	desire	of	ours	(either	
an	actual	desire,	or	one	we	would	have	if	we	were	fully	informed	and	vividly	
imagining	all	relevant	facts).12	
By	contrast,	on	objectivism,	our	reasons	are	provided	by	the	good—either	by	
the	goodness	of	the	things	that	are	good	or	(on	buck-passing	accounts)	by	these	
good	things	directly.13	When	we	have	a	reason	to	do	something,	this	is	just	because	
there	would	be	something	valuable	achieved	by	doing	it.	
Both	subjectivism	and	objectivism	are	attractive	in	their	own	ways.	Consider	
subjectivism.	It	seems	there	could	be	cases	in	which	there	would	be	nothing	good	
about	someone’s	doing	a	certain	thing,	but	where	we	have	to	concede	that	this	
person	has	every	reason	to	do	the	thing	and	no	reason	not	to.	Suppose,	for	instance,	
that	aliens	are	thinking	of	invading	Earth,	killing	us	all,	and	taking	our	resources.14	If	
these	beings	care	nothing	about	us,	and	indeed,	let	us	suppose,	are	incapable	of	
doing	so,	then	they	might,	it	seems,	have	every	reason	to	invade	and	no	reason	not	
to,	despite	the	extreme	badness	of	their	doing	so.15	
A	second	reason	to	like	subjectivism	is	that	objectivism	faces	major	
difficulties.	Objectivism	implies	that	intrinsic	desires	can	themselves	be	intrinsically	
reasonable	or	unreasonable.	Many	objectivists	hold,	for	example,	that	even	if	you	
don’t	care	about	others	or	their	well-being,	you	should	care	about	these	things.16	
One	should	care	about	others	and	their	well-being	whatever	one	is	like.	While	this	
might	sound	plausible	on	its	face,	it	is	difficult	upon	closer	inspection	to	make	much	
sense	of	it.	Intrinsic	desires,	after	all,	are	simply	not	in	the	business	of	trying	to	get	
                                                
11	It	is	notoriously	difficult	to	characterise	the	subject	matter	of	reasons	for	action	in	an	
informative	but	neutral	or	non-question-begging	way.	Many	have	said	that	a	normative	
reason	for	action	is	a	consideration	that	speaks	in	favour	of	acting	some	way.	But	this	
doesn’t	seem	terribly	informative	to	me.	I	propose	instead	the	following	characterisation:	A	
person	has	a	reason	to	do	a	certain	thing	just	in	case	it	would	be	in	some	way	fitting	or	
appropriate	that	she	have	some	motivation	to	do	the	thing	in	question.	For	more	on	
fittingness	approaches	in	metaethics	and	value	theory,	see	McHugh	and	Way	(2016),	
Howard	(forthcoming),	and	Chappell	(2012).	
12	See,	for	example,	Sobel	(2001),	Brandt	(1979),	Williams	(1981),	and	Schroeder	(2007).	
13	See	Parfit	(2011),	Quinn	(1993),	and	Scanlon	(1998).	
14	See	Harman	(1975).	
15	It	would	not,	of	course,	follow	from	subjectivism	that	we	should	let	them	invade.	We	
might,	given	our	own	cares	and	concerns,	have	every	reason	to	resist	them.	See	Williams	
(1995).	
16	One	objectivist,	Parfit,	writes:	“We	have	instrumental	reasons	to	want	something	to	
happen,	or	to	act	in	some	way,	when	this	event	or	act	would	have	effects	that	we	have	some	
reason	to	want.	As	that	claim	implies,	every	instrumental	reason	gets	its	normative	force	
from	some	other	reason.	This	other	reason	may	itself	be	instrumental,	getting	its	force	from	
some	third	reason.	But	at	the	beginning	of	any	such	chain	of	reasons,	there	must	be	some	
fact	that	gives	us	a	reason	to	want	some	possible	event	as	an	end,	or	for	its	own	sake.	Such	
reasons	are	provided	by	the	intrinsic	features	that	would	make	this	possible	event	in	some	
way	good.”	Parfit	(2011),	p.	91.	
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how	the	world	is	right	in	any	way.	They	are	brute	existences.	It	is	exceedingly	odd,	
then,	to	think	that	they	could	be	fitting	or	unfitting,	appropriate	or	inappropriate,	in	
any	intrinsic	sense.	
Moreover,	what	if	there	were	beings	who	were	constitutionally	incapable	of	
desiring	the	things	that	one	ought	intrinsically	to	desire?	Recall	the	aliens	above.	If	
they	are	constitutionally	incapable	of	intrinsically	caring	about	the	well-being	of	
humans,	in	what	sense	could	it	be	true	that	they	ought	so	to	care?	Plausibly,	after	all,	
‘ought’	implies	‘can’.	
Consider	now	objectivism.	Why	is	it	attractive?	There	are,	it	seems	to	me,	
two	important	motivations	for	objectivism.	First,	it	is	tempting	to	think	that	there	
can	be	reasons	to	act	only	if	some	things	matter.	If	nothing	mattered,	then	it	would	
not	matter	what	we	did,	and	in	this	case	it	is	hard	to	see	how	any	of	us	could	have	a	
reason	to	do	anything.	If	nothing	mattered,	then	in	carrying	on	our	daily	lives,	
thinking	we	had	reasons	to	act	and	acting	on	these	supposed	reasons,	it	would	seem	
that	we	were	all	making	some	kind	of	mistake	or	operating	under	a	delusion.	If	
objectivism	is	true,	this	is	easy	to	explain.	By	contrast,	if	subjectivism	is	true,	it	is	not	
clear	we	could	explain	it.	On	subjectivism,	it	should	be	enough	in	order	for	there	to	
be	reasons,	that	there	be	some	beings	who	care	about	things	and	can	do	something	
about	them.	
The	second	reason	objectivism	is	attractive	is	that	it	is	tempting	to	think	that	
there	are	some	things	that	each	of	us	has	a	reason	to	do—say,	treat	others	well,	
avoid	one’s	own	future	suffering,	and	so	on.17	Objectivism	can	easily	account	for	this.	
It	is	not	obvious,	however,	whether	subjectivism	can	do	so.	On	subjectivism,	if	
someone	happened	to	care	nothing	about	others,	then	it	would	seem	possible	that	
this	person	has	no	reason	whatever	to	treat	others	well.	
Now,	to	the	central	claim	of	this	section.	If	EBF	is	true,	then	there	is	a	way	to	
reconcile	subjectivism	and	objectivism.	Specifically,	we	can	be	subjectivists	who	get	
the	main	benefits	of	objectivism.	How	so?	Start	with	the	first	reason	objectivism	is	
attractive—i.e.,	the	apparent	dependence	of	our	reasons	on	some	things	mattering.	
If	reasons	are	(as	subjectivism	says)	provided	by	desires,	and	(as	EBF	says)	the	only	
thing	each	of	us	intrinsically	cares	about	is	the	good,	then	it	is	clearly	a	necessary	
condition	of	anyone’s	having	a	reason	to	do	anything	that	there	be	some	things	of	
value	in	the	world.	If	nothing	mattered,	then	those	who	went	about	their	lives	
thinking	they	had	reasons	to	act	would	be	in	a	clear	sense	mistaken	or	deluded.	
Now	consider	the	second	reason	objectivism	is	attractive—i.e.,	the	seeming	
fact	that	there	are	some	things	that	each	of	us	has	a	reason	to	do.	Why	do	I	have	a	
reason	to	avoid	my	own	future	suffering	even	if	I	am	indifferent	to	my	own	future	
self’s	interests?	If	EBF	is	true,	we	can	say	it	is	because	such	suffering	would	be	a	bad	
thing,	and	(like	every	other	desiring	creature)	I	am	concerned	about	what	would	be	
bad.	Why	do	I	have	a	reason	to	treat	others	well,	whether	or	not	I	care	about	these	
particular	individuals?	It	is	because,	while	I	might	not	care	about	others	at	all,	I	
necessarily	care	about	the	good,	and	the	well-being	of	others	is	something	that	is	
good.	Just	as	objectivists	have	been	at	pains	to	emphasise,	my	reason	to	treat	others	
well	is	not	(as	subjectivists	tend	to	say)	that	I	happen	to	care	about	these	particular	
                                                
17	See	Parfit	(2011).	
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people.	My	reason	is	that	it	is	good	that	they	do	well.	It’s	just	that	this	is	a	reason	for	
me	only	in	combination	with	my	necessary	desire	for	the	good.18	19	
	
5.	Objections	
	
Despite	its	significant	explanatory	power,	some	readers	will	find	EBF	hard	to	accept.	
Some	will	object	that	there	are	clearly	times	when	we	think	something	would	be	
good	(or	even	best)	without	wanting	it	at	all.	For	example,	I	might	know	it	would	be	
best	to	go	to	the	dentist	today,	while	having	no	desire	whatever	to	do	so.		
But	we	must	be	careful	not	to	confuse	a	desire	for	something	with	mere	
attraction	to,	or	feeling	like,	it.	To	be	attracted	to	or	feel	like	something	is	a	matter	of	
vividly	anticipating	some	pleasure	or	pain-relief	from	it,	something	that	does	not	
imply	a	desire	for	it.	This	is	relevant	because	it	is	entirely	possible	to	think	something	
would	be	good	in	some	way	without	being	attracted	to	or	feeling	like	it	at	all,	and	
this	fact	might	be	what	is	confusing	some	critics	here.	Take	the	case	of	the	dentist.	In	
this	familiar	sort	of	case,	what	seems	to	be	going	on	is	that	one	thinks	it	would	be	
good	to	visit	the	dentist,	but	does	not	feel	like	going	at	all	(since	one	does	not—at	
least,	not	in	the	case	of	a	routine	check-up—vividly	anticipate	any	pleasure	or	pain-
relief	from	so	doing).	It	does	not	follow	that	one	does	not	want	to	go.	One	might	well	
have	some	desire	to	go,	in	the	relevant	sense.20	
Others	will	object	to	EBF	that	there	are	clearly	times	when	we	want	
something	without	thinking	it	good	at	all.	For	example,	one	might	desire	one	of	the	
following	things	without	thinking	it	good	in	the	slightest:	
	
To	splash	about	in	the	bath	like	a	fish.21	
To	smash	icicles.22	
To	steal	pears	from	a	nearby	orchard	in	order	to	discard	them.23	
That	a	high	speed	car	chase	one	is	watching	on	TV	end	in	a	spectacular	crash.	
To	wash	one’s	hands	repeatedly.	
To	put	all	the	items	on	one’s	desk	in	a	rigid,	regular	order.24	
That	one’s	friend	fail	in	some	pursuit.	
To	smash	one’s	opponent	in	the	face	with	one’s	squash	racquet.25	
To	drown	one’s	bawling	baby	in	the	bath	water.26	
                                                
18	My	reconciling	strategy	here	has	similarities	to	the	constitutivism	of	Korsgaard	(1996)	and	
Velleman	(2005).	
19	I	acknowledge	that	my	reconciling	strategy	will	not	satisfy	some	objectivists,	who	will	want	
to	maintain	that	not	only	do	each	of	us	in	fact	have	a	reason	to	treat	others	well,	this	would	
remain	true	whatever	people	desired.	For	a	nice	articulation	of	this	worry,	see	Schroeder	
(2007),	p.	107.	
20	Of	course,	one	might	feel	like	going	to	the	dentist	if	one	is	suffering	pain	from	toothache,	
and	anticipates	that	the	dentist	will	be	able	to	quickly	remedy	this.	
21	See	Raz	(2010).	
22	See	Sussman	(2009).	
23	See	Sussman	(2009).	
24	See	Stocker	(2004).	
25	See	Watson	(1982).	
26	See	Watson	(1982).	
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However,	it	is	again	vital	to	distinguish	between	desiring	something	and	merely	
feeling	like	it.	There	are	indeed	times	when	one	feels	like	something	(i.e.,	vividly	
anticipates	some	pleasure	or	pain-relief	from	it)	without	thinking	it	would	be	good	at	
all.	This	might	be	going	on	in	some	of	the	above	sorts	of	cases.	It	does	not	follow,	
however,	that	one	can	genuinely	want	something,	in	the	relevant	sense,	without	
thinking	that	it	would	be	good	in	some	way.	
It	might	be	objected	to	what	I’ve	just	said	that	in	some	of	the	above	cases,	it	
is	clear	that	the	relevant	individuals	do	not	merely	feel	like	the	things	in	question,	
but	actually	want	them	as	well,	since	they	might	actually	perform	the	associated	
actions.	Some	people	smash	their	opponents,	drown	their	babies,	wash	their	hands	
repeatedly,	and	so	on.	But	it	is	not	plausible,	this	objection	goes,	that	in	all	these	
cases	the	individuals	concerned	think	these	actions	would	be	best.	On	the	contrary,	
all	normal	individuals	know,	at	all	times,	that	such	actions	are	not	best.	
But	this	seems	to	me	far	too	optimistic	about	our	cognitive	capacities.	We	
humans	are	finite	beings,	who	can	hold	in	our	heads	only	so	much	at	a	single	time.	
People	who	are	extremely	stressed	or	suffering	greatly	might	simply	run	out	of	
mental	space	at	certain	times	for	continuing	to	appreciate	the	value	of	things	outside	
of	themselves	and	their	own	immediate	feelings.	The	stress	or	suffering	felt	by	a	
frustrated	squash	player	or	young	mother	who	is	struggling	to	cope	with	her	new	life	
as	a	parent	might,	if	only	for	a	brief	moment,	become	so	overwhelming	or	dominant	
in	these	people’s	psychologies	that	it	literally	crowds	out,	for	the	duration	of	that	
moment,	their	appreciation	of	the	true	nature	or	extent	of	the	disvalue	of	their	
opponent’s	being	injured	or	their	baby’s	being	drowned.	This	moment	might	be	
brief,	but	long	enough	to	act	in.	
It	might	next	be	objected	that	EBF	lacks	the	resources	to	account	for	some	
phenomena	we	all	know	well:	temptation	and	weakness	of	will.	It	is	a	familiar	fact,	it	
might	be	said,	that	it	can	be	hard	to	get	oneself	to	do	what	one	thinks	best,	and	
sometimes	one	fails.	EBF	is	inconsistent	with	this	plain	fact.	If	EBF	were	true,	it	
should	be	neither	easy	nor	hard	to	do	what	one	thinks	best—judging	an	action	best	
and	deciding	to	do	it	should	go	hand	in	hand,	so	to	speak.	
But	I	think	EBF	actually	provides	a	very	appealing	account	of	what	is	going	on	
in	temptation	and	weakness	of	will.	We	can	explain	these	things	on	the	model	of	
concentration.	Consider	what	it	is	like	to	try	to	hold	on	to	an	idea	in	your	head	while	
you	are	sleepy,	or	remember	what	you	were	planning	to	say	while	waiting	for	a	gap	
to	come	up	in	conversation,	or	keep	in	mind	a	certain	number	(a	phone	number,	
perhaps)	while	your	mean	friends	are	trying	to	make	you	forget	it	by	reciting	
numbers	at	random,	or	focus	on	your	work	while	catchy	music	is	playing	in	the	
background	or	people	are	chatting	loudly	on	their	cell-phones,	etc.	It	can	be	hard.	It	
is	in	just	the	same	way,	I	want	to	suggest,	that	exercising	willpower	can	be	hard.	
Moments	of	temptation	are	moments	when	we	are	aware	that,	owing	to	our	
experience	or	vivid	anticipation	of	certain	intense	pleasures,	our	judgment	of	what	
would	be	best	is	changing,	and	we	are	going	to	have	to	exercise	real	mental	effort	if	
we	are	to	keep	hold	of	our	existing	judgment.	Willpower,	then,	can	be	understood	as	
a	species	of	concentration.	It	is	concentration	on	the	good.	
An	example	might	help	to	explain	what	I	mean	here.	Suppose	Alex,	who	is	on	
a	diet,	is	offered	some	chocolate	cake.	He	thinks	it	would	be	best	to	refrain,	but	is	
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sorely	tempted.	His	temptation	here,	I	am	suggesting,	consists	in	his	awareness	that	
his	anticipation	of	pleasure	from	the	cake	is	starting	to	change	his	belief	about	what	
would	be	best	that	he	do.	He	sees	that	he	is	starting	to	form	the	false	belief	that	it	
would	be	best	to	break	his	diet	on	this	particular	occasion	and	eat	the	cake.	The	
more	he	thinks	about	eating	the	cake	and	the	associated	pleasure,	the	larger	the	
value	of	this	pleasure	looms	in	his	consciousness,	and	the	less	he	is	able	to	focus	on	
the	value	of	sticking	with	his	diet	on	this	occasion.	If	Alex	exercises	willpower	to	
resist	this	temptation	and	succeeds	in	resisting	it,	this	is	just	his	succeeding	in	
concentrating	on	the	good	of	sticking	with	his	diet	long	enough	to	outlast	the	
threatened	change	to	his	evaluative	belief.27	
It	might	next	be	objected	that	EBF	cannot	account	for	the	existence	of	the	
reactive	attitudes—our	feelings	of	indignation,	resentment,	guilt,	etc.	If	we	always	
decide	to	do	what	we	think	best,	what	could	possibly	explain	these	feelings?	
Furthermore,	if	we	always	decide	to	do	what	we	think	best,	how	could	it	ever	be	
appropriate	or	fitting	for	us	to	feel	them?		
EBF,	however,	I	believe,	has	a	good	way	of	accounting	for	the	existence	of	
these	feelings,	as	well	as	their	appropriateness	on	certain	occasions.	Why	do	we	feel	
these	things?	Not	out	of	an	awareness	of	somebody’s	acting	contrary	to	her	own	
judgment	of	what	would	be	best,	but	rather	from	an	awareness	that	somebody	has	a	
tendency	to	forget	about	or	lose	sight	of	the	well-being	of	others	or	its	value.	When	
are	such	feelings	fitting	or	appropriate?	Just	when	they	are	felt	in	response	to	
somebody’s	in	fact	possessing	this	regrettable	tendency.	
EBF,	indeed,	explains	why	these	feelings	have	the	particular	phenomenal	
character	they	do.	Why	do	we	feel	just	these	‘hot’	or	angry	emotions	toward	those	
who	have	a	tendency	to	lose	sight	of	the	well-being	of	others	or	its	value,	rather	than	
some	other	sort	of	feelings	lacking	any	such	‘hotness’?	If	EBF	is	true,	we	can	say	it	is	
because	of	the	usefulness	of	such	feelings	in	helping	ourselves	and	others	to	better	
concentrate	on,	or	keep	in	mind,	the	well-being	of	other	people.	
Consider	the	following	analogy	with	sport.	It	is	common	for	athletes	to	feel	
angry	with	themselves	for,	say,	missing	an	easy	shot	or	choosing	the	wrong	strategy	
at	a	crucial	moment.	These	angry	or	‘hot’	feelings,	it	seems,	can	be	in	a	certain	way	
fitting	or	appropriate	at	times.	Why	is	it	these	particular	‘hot’	feelings	that	are	the	
fitting	or	appropriate	response	to	such	errors?	It	seems	to	have	to	do	with	the	
usefulness	of	such	feelings	in	helping	athletes	to	concentrate	better	in	the	future.	On	
the	next	occasion	they	face	a	shot	or	choice	of	this	kind,	they	will	be	unconsciously	
aware	that	if	they	lose	concentration	again,	they	will	have	to	contend	with	their	own	
angry	attitudes	(something	that	each	of	us	naturally	wants	to	avoid).	
A	similar	thing	is	going	on,	I	want	to	suggest,	in	the	moral	case.	Feeling	angry	
with	someone	(either	oneself	or	another)	for	losing	sight	of	other	people’s	well-
being	or	its	value	can	be	the	fitting	or	appropriate	thing	to	feel	at	certain	times	
because	of	its	usefulness	in	helping	one	to	better	keep	in	mind	or	concentrate	on	the	
well-being	of	others.	When	one	realises	that	one	has	lost	sight	of	such	things	and	
                                                
27	I	do	not	claim	to	have	proven	here	that	this	is	the	right	account	of	temptation	and	
willpower.	My	point	is	the	more	minimal	one	that	there	is	a	promising	explanation	of	this	
phenomena	available	to	an	advocate	of	EBF.	
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feels	such	a	corresponding	sting,	one	is	thereby	made	less	likely	to	lose	
concentration	on	other	people’s	well-being	or	its	value	in	the	future.	
This	account	also	explains	why	such	attitudes	can	be	appropriately	felt	only	
toward	normal	adult	humans.	Babies	and	non-human	animals	cannot	understand	
other	beings’	well-being	or	its	value	in	the	sort	of	way	necessary	to	possess	the	
relevant	tendency	to	lose	sight	of	these	things.	As	for	human	adults	who	act	badly	
only	because	they	are,	say,	hypnotised,	coerced,	mentally	ill,	etc.,	while	they	(unlike	
babies	and	non-human	animals)	do	possess	the	ability	to	understand	other	beings’	
well-being	and	its	value,	their	actions	on	these	occasions	are	not	the	result	of	the	
sort	of	tendency	to	lose	sight	of	these	things	that	I	have	been	referring	to.28	
I	want	to	consider	one	final	objection	to	EBF.	EBF,	it	might	be	said,	is	
inconsistent	with	the	existence	of	morally	bad	people.	If	we	always	decided	to	do	
what	we	thought	best,	then	we	would	all	be	moral	saints	or	morally	unimpeachable,	
something	that	is	clearly	not	the	case.	
But	there	is	a	way	in	which,	on	EBF,	there	can	be	morally	bad	people.	This	is	
because,	even	if	we	all	necessarily	decide	to	do	what	we	think	best,	some	of	us	
possess	the	above-mentioned	regrettable	tendency	to	lose	sight	of,	or	fail	to	think	
about,	the	well-being	of	others	or	its	value.	This	tendency	seems	the	very	heart	of	
selfishness,	a	paradigm	moral	failing.	
Perhaps	EBF	is	incompatible	with	a	certain	kind	of	morally	bad	person—
namely,	the	sort	of	person	who	deserves	to	suffer	for	her	bad	actions	or	character	
(i.e.,	whose	suffering	would	be	intrinsically	good	due	to	who	she	is	or	what	she	has	
done).	Such	a	person	might	indeed	have	to	be	capable	of	acting	clear-eyedly	against	
her	own	judgment	of	what	would	be	best.	But	this	incompatibility,	I	would	suggest,	is	
not	a	drawback,	but	rather	an	advantage	of	EBF.	It	seems	very	doubtful	that	anyone	
could	deserve	to	suffer	in	the	way	just	described.	Nobody’s	suffering	in	and	of	itself	
makes	the	world	go	better.	EBF	nicely	explains	why	this	is	so.	
	
6.	Conclusion	and	Implications	
	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	provided	a	preliminary	defense	of	EBF,	the	view	that	each	of	
us	has	just	one	intrinsic	desire,	a	desire	for	the	good,	and	that	every	other	desire	we	
have	is	the	combination	of	this	intrinsic	desire	and	some	belief	that	a	certain	thing	
would	be	good	in	some	way.	EBF,	I	argued,	is	highly	explanatory	and	has	promising	
answers	available	to	it	to	the	most	serious	objections	it	faces.	
I	want	to	finish	by	pointing	out	two	important	implications	of	EBF.	Suppose	
EBF	is	true.	What	follows?	First,	we	needn’t	worry	that	we	think	some	things	matter	
only	because	we	happen	to	want	or	care	about	things	and	are	projecting	these	
desires	onto	the	external	world.	If	EBF	is	true,	there	cannot	be	any	desires	without	
evaluative	beliefs	first.	
Second,	having	ruled	out	the	possibility	that	our	evaluative	thoughts	are	due	
merely	to	our	wanting	things,	it	becomes	much	more	plausible	to	think	that	some	
things	really	do	matter	or	have	value	(i.e.,	that	some	sort	of	value	realism	is	true).	
This	is	because,	having	ruled	out	the	aforementioned	possibility,	it	becomes	much	
more	likely	that	our	evaluative	thoughts	are	due	to	our	encountering	real	value.	Why	
                                                
28	I	am	influenced	here	by	Smart	(1961)	and	Schlick	(1939).	
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do	we	think	that	there	are	some	things	that	matter	or	have	value?	It	is	because	there	
are	such	things	and	we	have	come	to	recognise	this.		
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